Using pseudo-panel data, we estimate the structural parameters of a life--cycle consumption model with discrete labor supply choice. A focus of our analysis is the abrupt drop in consumption upon retirement for a typical household. The literature sometimes refers to the drop, which in the U.S.
Introduction
The life-cycle saving model is a cornerstone of modern economic policy analysis. Researchers use the framework to study, among other topics, economic growth, business cycles, social insurance, and trade and tax policies (e.g., Diamond [1965] , Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987] , Lucas [1990 Lucas [ , 2003 , Hubbard et al. [1995] , Altig et al. [2001] , and many others). In a number of applications, both the model's ability to match data and the answer it gives to economic questions depend critically on values of its parameters, especially the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption. For example, see Woodford [2003, ch.4] on macroeconomic implications, Weil [1989] on the risk free rate puzzle, Lucas [2003] on the welfare costs of business cycles, and Jones et al. [2003] on the relationship between volatility and growth. The importance of the model's parameters naturally generates interest in credible and precise estimates of their magnitudes (e.g., Hall [1988] , Campbell and Mankiw [1989] , and Attanasio and Weber [1993] ). Controversy about parameter values nevertheless persists, in part due to data limitations. We believe, however, that the recent literature documenting the drop in average household consumption expenditure at retirement -the "retirement-consumption puzzle" -suggests a new avenue for progress.
With the goal of enhancing the life-cycle model's usefulness for current and future policy research, this paper reconciles the model with empirical evidence on the change in households' expenditure at retirement and then uses the magnitude of that change as a novel and, we argue, advantageous source of identification in estimating parameters.
A number of recent papers describe a substantial drop in household expenditures at retirement.
1 Some authors view the sudden change in expenditures as a puzzle. Indeed, is anticipated, and when utility is an additively separable function of consumption and leisure, consumption should change continuously with age.
However, preferences over consumption and leisure may not take an additively separable form. 2 Furthermore, a number of economists argue that opportunities for market-work hours are not continuous. We show formally below that a tractable life-cycle specification with intratemporal utility that is nonseparable in consumption and leisure, with work options that are discrete, and with a retirement age that emerges from household choice, predicts a discontinuous consumption change at retirement.
We then show that if one is willing to treat the change in household consumption at retirement as a consequence of purposeful behavior, the magnitude of the change provides useful information for estimating life-cycle model parameters. Consider the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). Suppose that consumption and leisure are complements (i.e., that we have intratemporal nonseparability) and that a household anticipates a discrete increase in leisure upon retiring. In that case, the household will want to change its consumption abruptly at retirement; moreover, the direction and magnitude of the desired change will depend on the household's taste for smoothing utility over time, that is, on its IES for consumption/leisure services. In particular, if a household's taste for intertemporal smoothing is high, it may choose to decrease its consumption at retirement so that lost utility from consumption offsets gains from additional leisure. If, on the other hand, it has
and Stephens [2004] , and Aguiar and Hurst [2004] . The decline estimated in these papers ranges from 7% to 35%.
2 Indeed Attanasio and Weber [1993] and Meghir and Weber [1996] argue that allowing for nonseparability is crucial for fitting the data.
a lower desire for intertemporal smoothing, a household might increase its consumption at retirement -to take advantage of the complementarity of consumption and leisure.
The size, and sign, of the consumption change registered in the data can thus help us to estimate households' IES.
By offering an alternative method for identifying life-cycle parameters, especially the IES, this paper contributes to a literature that has formed two basic strands. The first calibrates the life-cycle model from (macro) data and various existing studies (e.g., Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987] , Cooley and Prescott [1995] , and Altig et al. [2001] ). This strand tends to favor a moderate IES for consumption, usually between 0.2 and 1.0. The second strand of the literature typically identifies the IES for consumption with the coefficient on the, properly instrumented, rate of return on assets in a consumption Euler equation.
This strand includes analyses of macro data, which sometimes estimate an IES very near zero (e.g., Hall [1988] , Campbell and Mankiw [1989] ), and analyses of micro data, which typically estimate an IES between 0.5 and 0.8 (e.g., Attanasio and Weber [1993] and Banks et al. [1998] ). Our approach can contribute evidence on the robustness of IES estimates to variation in method of estimation and decision domain. Furthermore, our method has the advantage that it estimates the IES from changes 3 Other papers have provided alternative methods for estimating and IES parameter.
For example, Barsky et al. [1997] use the responses to hypothetical questions to estimate the IES. Estimating fully specified structural models, Rust and Phelan [1997] is unstable for earlier data from the postwar period.
5 associated with a highly predictable and consequential life event, namely, retirement. The standard strategy of instrumenting for asset returns in period t+1 using economic variables known in period t suffers from two limitations. First, the relevant variation (anticipated changes in real rates of return) is modest in size, in practice perfectly correlated across individuals in a cross section and, therefore, seems unlikely to produce changes in behavior that are large enough to be precisely estimated from available data. Second, changes in asset returns are notoriously difficult to predict. As a result, problems of weak instruments arise. 4 This paper's identification strategy, in contrast, depends on a phenomenon that is economically substantial, mostly anticipated, and independently repeated within cross sections of data. In addition, our method has the advantage that it does not rely on unmodeled sources of variation. Interpreting rate-of-return estimates may require a specification with household decision making under uncertainty, household prediction of the distribution for future shocks, and even transactions costs -all elements beyond the scope of many policy-simulation models. Our procedure, on the other hand, straightforwardly employs a model designed for policy experiments.
Our approach relies on interpreting the change in expenditure at retirement as intentional. Haider and Stephens [2004] test an alternative idea that consumption declines on average at retirement because retirement is often unexpected. Using subjective predictions about retirement age as an instrument for anticipated retirement, they find that the expenditure decline remains statistically and economically significant (though one-third smaller than with non-IV estimates). In a related study, Hurd HRS data on retirement to extract estimates of structural parameters. We estimate, quite precisely, intertemporal elasticity parameter values that are on the higher end of those found and used in the literature: our IES for services is approximately 0.67, and we estimate an IES for consumption of 0.87. We then assess the model's "out-of-sample" fit by comparing its prediction of average household wealth at retirement with HRS data on middle class net worth (data which did not inform the estimation). Despite the inclusion of a drop in consumption at retirement, our model matches the wealth data remarkably well.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses several of our key assumptions. Section 3 presents our model and estimation strategy. Sections 4-5 discuss our data and present our estimates. Section 6 compares simulations from our model with HRS data on household net worth. Section 7 concludes. 7
Assumptions
In this paper's model, every household chooses its saving and labor supply to maximize its utility subject to a lifetime budget constraint. Our analysis assumes that (1) the work day is indivisible, (2) private-pension formulas do not affect workers' retirement age, (3) household preference orderings may be intratemporally nonseparable with respect consumption and leisure, and (4) perfect markets exist for annuities, health and disability insurance. Our rationale for assumptions (1)- (3) is as follows. The finding that most workers make discontinuous transitions from fulltime work to not working, and the finding that the majority of the relatively small number of 'gradual retirees' reduce their annual hours of work by taking on a sequence of lower wage partial retirement 'bridge jobs' rather than gradually reducing hours of work at their full-time pre-retirement 'career job' suggests the existence of explicit or implicit constraints on the individual's choice of hours of
work.
An indivisibility assumption is also consistent with the fact that U.S. data show little trend in male work hours or participation rates after 1940, except for a trend toward earlier retirement 1940-80 (e.g., Pencavel [1986] , Blundell and MaCurdy [1999] , and Burkhauser 5 Reasons for the wage penalty for part-time work include daily fixed costs of startup and shutdown, scheduling and coordination problems, employer concern for timely return on training investments, and the fixed-cost nature of some employee benefits (e.g., Hurd [1996] To see the restrictions imposed by intratemporal separability, consider a specific example. A single-person household lives from t = 0 to t = T , choosing to retire at t = R.
The household's time endowment at each age is 1; when the household works, its leisure falls to¯ ∈ (0, 1). According to assumption (1), indivisibilities force¯ to be a fixed parameter. The wage is w; the interest rate is r. A household's consumption c t yields utility flow u(c t ); its leisure t yields utility flow v( t ); and, its assets (net worth) are a t . The household's behavior solves
As utility depends on the sum u(c) + v( ), this is the separable case.
Provided u(.) is concave, specification (1) predicts that, even with a discrete increase in leisure at retirement, there should be no abrupt change in consumption at that time.
To see this note that, along an optimal consumption path, the additional utility at date s from one extra dollar's consumption, u (c s ), must equal the additional utility from the dollar if it were saved until later date t, by which time it will have grown to an amount e r·(t−s) . That is,
the so-called "Euler equation" for consumption. Letting c t− be consumption the instant before t, and c t+ the instant after, condition (2) yields
With u (.) continuous, equation (3) is inconsistent with a jump in consumption at any age, including at the age of retirement.
While intratemporal additivity is the most common specification for utility in the life-cycle literature, a number of authors instead assume nonseparable preferences. A well-known example is Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987] . 6 We can easily modify example (1) to accommodate their alternative. Let a household have a constant returns to scale "neoclassical" production function f : R 2 → R 1 that combines current consumption and leisure to generate a flow of services, the latter yielding a flow of utility, say, u(f ). The first line of (1) changes to
though constraints can remain the same. Because a bivariate constant-returns-to-scale neoclassical production function has f 12 (.) > 0, inputs are complementary in the sense that more leisure (consumption) raises the marginal product of consumption (leisure).
If u(.) were linear, this complementarity would make the household want to increase its consumption at (and after) retirement to take advantage of the increased marginal utility of consumption that derives from higher leisure. If, on the other hand, u(.) is sufficiently concave, the household would strongly desire a smooth flow of services at different ages;
hence, it would plan more consumption prior to t = R to counterbalance its abundant service flow from leisure later. In the end, with nonseparability, rational behavior may lead to an age profile of consumption which discontinuously changes in either direction at retirement.
A specific parameterization with nonseparable consumption and leisure makes clear the connection between the change in consumption at retirement and the structural parameters of the life-cycle model, and it will form the framework for our empirical analysis later. Let the intratemporal household production function f (.) be Cobb-Douglas:
Let u(.) take the familiar isoelastic form
Recalling that changes from¯ ∈ [0, 1) to 1 at retirement, condition (3) at retirement date
Equation (5) shows that the change in consumption at retirement provides useful information for estimating the parameter γ, which determines the IES. Specifically, given α and¯ , the change in consumption at retirement pins down γ. It is straightforward to
show that the change in consumption at retirement is strictly increasing in γ. In particular, if γ is nearly 1, u(.) is nearly linear; and we have noted that in this case consumption jumps up at retirement. More generally, whenever 0 < γ, consumption discontinuously rises at retirement:
On the other hand, the preceding algebra indicates that
Thus, whenever γ < 0, the model predicts a discontinuous drop in consumption at retirement and, because (c R+ − c R− ) is increasing in γ, the decline in consumption at retirement grows larger as the taste for intertemporal smoothing increases (γ decreases).
To summarize, our analysis illustrates that an abrupt adjustment in consumption at retirement is consistent with rational behavior. Equation (5) also shows that data on the size of change in consumption can help us to identify the taste for intertemporal substitution. We now turn to this task of estimation.
Model
This section presents the model that is the basis for our empirical analysis. We first elaborate the framework above to facilitate comparisons with data as follows: we allow for changes in household size and composition that may influence households' preferences for consumption; and, we consider the possible role of liquidity constraints. Then we lay out our estimation strategy.
Equivalent Adults. To confront data, we take into account the fact that households gain and lose members over their life spans, and presumably desire greater consumption at ages when their membership is larger.
Following Tobin [1967] , let the number of "equivalent adults" per household of age t be n t . Let n t satisfy
where the household's head constitutes one equivalent adult, n S t is 1 if there is a spouse and 0 otherwise, n C t is the number of children in the household, and ξ S and ξ C are equivalency weights (relative to the head's weight of 1). If a household's age-t expenditure on consumption is c t , let the household's corresponding flow of utility be
The idea is that households internally allocate their lifetime resources "fairly." To understand the outcome, consider a household facing interest and subjective discount rates 13 of zero and suppose that s = t . Then in our framework, the household would want to allocate budget x between periods s and t to solve
When u f (. , s ) is concave, a solution requires c s /n s = c t /n t ; so, utility maximization implies
In other words, if the household consists of the head alone at s, five members at t, and the latter constitute two equivalent adults, the household will allocate twice as much budget for consumption at t as at s. If there are scale economies to household operation or public goods that household members can share, the weights on spouse and children will be less than 1. The smaller are ξ S and ξ C , the larger the advantages of scale. We will estimate ξ S and ξ C .
Liquidity Constraints. A large literature studies the potential effects of liquidity constraints on life-cycle saving (e.g., Mariger [1986] , Zeldes [1989] , Hubbard and Judd [1986] ).
To analyze actual behavior, we separately consider two cases. In the first, financial markets are unwilling to extend loans without collateral; thus, if a t is household net worth at age t, we incorporate into our model a constraint
In the second case, we allow a t take any value (provided only that a 0 = a T = 0). For example, it is conceivable that unsecured credit-card debt has, at least in the last several 14 decades, enabled U.S. households to carry negative net worth balances. Or, inter vivos transfers from parents to their grown children might largely eliminate the effects of liquidity constraints.
Model. The life-cycle maximization model upon which we base our empirical analysis is as follows: for household i,
where ρ is the subjective discount rate, and equivalent adults, n it , come from (6). Household i supplies e it "effective hours" in the labor market per hour of work time; hence, if w is the economy wide average wage rate, the household earns e is ·w per hour of market work at age s. Earnings include both the wages of the head and those of the spouse, if present and working in the labor market. We assume a proportional income tax τ on earnings,
interest, and one half of Social Security benefits, ssb it . The real interest rate r is given in net-of-tax terms. There is also a proportional Social Security tax τ ss . As above, we take f (.) to be Cobb-Douglas and u(.) to be isoelastic. In our first case, we incorporate 15 liquidity constraint (8) , as shown. In a second case, we analyze (9) omitting the constraint
The isoelastic utility function u(.) is standard. Our Cobb-Douglas specification for f (.) has a number of advantages over a more general CES function that is sometimes used in the literature: it does not imply secular trends in the average retirement age due to technological progress; it is consistent with our aggregative approach in the sense that it does not lead households of different earning ability (i.e., different e it in (9) at the same age t) to behave differently; and, it allows exact identification below without disaggregative data, time series variation in tax rates, etc.
Identification. This paper estimates two equations based on model (9) . The first is the Euler equation from utility maximization with respect to consumption; the second stems from utility maximization with respect to retirement age. The parameters of ultimate interest form a vector
With both estimating equations together, the elements of θ are exactly identified.
Euler equation. Suppose for a given retirement age R i that we solve (9) for the utilitymaximizing life-cycle time path of consumption. We then face a concave maximization problem with a convex constraint set. Liquidity constraint (8) Consider s ∈ [S, R i ). The arguments of Section 2 imply
So,
In other words,
The preceding expression, and the reasoning of (5), determine our consumption Euler equation:
Integrating the budget constraints of (9), setting
for s < S, and setting c is from (10) otherwise, we obtain
Thus, ψ iS reflects a household's entire life course -including its earning ability, number of children, and retirement age.
Our empirical specification takes logarithms of both sides of (10) and appends a term ν is to the right side to reflect consumption measurement errors. From (6),
Writing (10) at s ≥ S and again at s + 1, taking logs, and differencing, we have
where we use the indicator function
Differencing eliminates ψ iS from (11) . Removing the influence of, among other things, varying earning abilities, is extremely convenient in practice -our Health and Retirement Study data provide lifetime earning records for only one cohort of households, and, although we have Consumer Expenditure Survey consumption data for many cohorts, the latter data's overlap with the cohort having complete earning information is short. Section 4 estimates (11) as a linear regression equation.
Optimal retirement age. The four coefficients of difference equation (11) are composites of the five structural parameters of the underlying model: letting the vector β denote the coefficients of (11), we have
Even if we have estimated β, we need one more condition to identify α, γ, and ρ separately.
To complete our identification, we turn to a second equation stemming from maximization of (9) with respect to retirement age R i .
For any parameter vector θ, one can solve model (9) for a household's optimal retirement age. After maximizing (9) with respect to consumption -our Euler-equation step above -call the criterion V (R i ). Our next step chooses the R which maximizes V (R).
Although V (.) may not be concave, our numerical calculation maximizes V (R) by trying every monthly retirement age from 0 to T . 7 Denote the optimal retirement age as g(θ).
Given our functional forms, even if households have different wage rates, reflecting different inherent earning abilities, their desired retirement ages are the same. Preferred retirement ages could, nevertheless, differ in practice because households anticipate differences in longevity due to heredity; households have differing numbers of children; occupations differ in their physical and emotional stress, leading to occupational differences in e it at advanced ages; households have different health status; households have differing tastes for leisure; etc. To model possible variations in preferences, health, and demography, we could modify the lifetime utility function of (9) to
where ϕ i is positive (negative) if household i has an unusually strong (weak) induced 7 Having found the best month in a discrete choice space, for increased computational accuracy we then solve the first-order condition V (R) = 0 -for the local maximum. A derivation of the first-order condition is available from the authors on request.
19 preference for leisure. The optimal retirement age is then
where R i is the household's actual retirement age, and η i is a random error reflecting deviations from average in ϕ i .
Estimating the Structural Parameters Suppose our Euler equation generates an estimatê
β of vector β. We calibrate¯ below. Letting x ≡ −β 4 / ln(¯ ), the fourth term of (12) yields
If we knew α, (14) would determine γ. The first term in (12) would then pin down ρ.
Our strategy is as follows. We estimateβ from consumption Euler equation (11) . Then expression (14) shows that θ = θ(α ,β). Combining the latter with (13), we estimate α from a regression of
Fortunately, one can expect to be able to match any retirement age R i with an α ∈ [0, 1].
For example, if α = 0, leisure but not consumption yields utility; so, households would choose never to work at all. If α = 1, on the other hand, consumption but not leisure yields utility; so, households would choose never to retire.
Consumption
We estimate the parameter composites of expression (12) from a GLS linear regression on equation (11) . This section describes our data and results.
CEX Data. The primary data source for this section is the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). It is the most comprehensive source of disaggregate consumption data for the U.S. The CEX obtains diary information on small purchases from one set of households; for a second set of households, it conducts quarterly interviews that catalog major purchases. The survey also collects demographic data and data on value of the respondent's house. At any given time, the sample consists of approximately 5,000 (7,000 after 1999) households each of which remains in the survey for at most 5 quarters. The survey was conducted at multi-year intervals prior to 1984, and annually thereafter. This paper uses the CEX surveys from 1984-2001.
8 Table 1 compares National Income and Product Account (NIPA) personal consumption for 1985, 1990, 1995 , and 2000 with weighted totals from the CEX. 9 We exclude household expenditures on pensions and life insurance from the CEX: the former constitute saving, and our concept of earnings is net of insurance. Looking at the last row of we gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the BLS in providing stub files of changing category definitions. 9 We abstract from the empirical difference between consumption and expenditure (e.g., Aguiar and Hurst [2004] ). Except in the case of housing, this paper draws no distinction between consumer durable stocks and flows. 10 There is a particularly large gap for "apparel" in 1985. The 1984 and 1985 data files omit a number of apparel subcategories. We assume this does not create biases with respect to age -so that our scaling procedure below is sufficient to eliminate the problem.
tion categories, uniformly across ages, to match NIPA amounts. Appendix I describes in detail three additional adjustments concerning the treatment of housing services, health care, and personal business expenditures. 
We organize the data so that a household's age is the age of the wife for a married couple, and the age of the single household head in other cases.
The CEX provides information on whether the household is married. The latter provides our regressor n S ∈ {0 , 1}. Although the CEX also reports number of children ages 0-17, we are interested in the consumption of older children; hence, we construct our own measure of children per household as follows. Using Census data on births per woman at age i, i ∈ {15, ..., 49}, in year t ∈ {1920, ..., 2001}, we simulate the number of children of each age for women of separate ages i in 1984,...,2001.
11 As stated, our data set assigns household observations to each age cell according to the age of the adult woman for all but single male households. We append numbers of children to each cell on the basis of the ages and birth dates of women.
Similarly, the CEX survey questions on retirement are not ideal for our purposes.
The CEX interview questionnaire (e.g., http://stats.bls.gov/cex/csxce30201.pdf) only asks whether the respondent is "retired" if he or she had zero weeks of work in the last twelve We consider a household retired if the head is at least 50 years old and answers that he or she is out of the labor force at the time of the March survey. For male-female couples, the household is retired for our purposes if the male is at least 50 and out of the labor market (in the March survey). We focus on male behavior because males were more attached to the labor force in the cohorts of our data that reach retirement age, and because our analysis abstracts from a detailed model of decision making within dual earner households and home-work/market-work choices.
Regression Results. Tables 2-3 and, number of children 0-22, n C . positive coefficient. The first dummy-variable coefficients are indeed large and significantly different from zero; however, the effect seems to run its course by age 25.
In the end, we restrict our attention to Euler-equation estimates from columns 2-4 of Table 2 . If liquidity constraints are not important in practice, using only columns 2-4 sacrifices some valid data; however, if constraints do bind for households but we nevertheless use column 1, our estimates will be inconsistent.
Consider the third column of Table 2 . The constant implies an average lifetime growth 14 While our estimate of the decline in expenditure at retirement is relatively modest, it may still represent an overestimate if the timing of retirement is, to some extent, unanticipated and disproportionately driven by shocks that decrease lifetime income. Our certainty equivalent model assumes that the relevant risk is fully insured and therefore does not affect the shape of the age-consumption profile. In reality, however, there may be uninsured shocks. Unanticipated retirements driven by positive shocks to health or asset returns, and therefore lifetime income, would likely be associated with discrete increases in consumption. These cases would tend to bias our estimate of the anticipated change in consumption at retirement upwards. Conversely, retirements driven by negative, uninsured shocks would likely be associated with discrete decreases in consumption. To the extent that retirement is unanticipated, and disproportionately driven by shocks that lower expected lifetime income, our estimates would overstate the degree to which the decline in consumption at retirement derives from the nonseparability of consumption and leisure.
The non-zero coefficient and large t statistic on "Retired" in Table 3 reject intratem- 14 Earlier drafts of this paper with less disaggregate treatment of medical expenditures (recall Appendix I) implied declines of 20 percent or more, but we believe that our current specification is more accurate.
poral additive separability of consumption and leisure -and Section 2 shows that the rejection does not heavily depend upon the form of our production function. One would expect that estimating the coefficient for children would be difficult. Although the date at which a child enters a household is precise, in practice different children leave home at different ages. Unfortunately, liquidity constraints may bind exactly when many children are born (recall that our Euler equation only perceives changes in numbers of children). Nevertheless, our estimated coefficients on "Child 0-22" have small standard errors and large t statistics. Our treatment does not, of course, measure reductions in parental market work hours due to children. Although this omission surely affects one's interpretation of our coefficients, Section 5's earning profiles do reflect women's actual labor force participation and hours -so this margin of choice enters our analysis in another way. It may be true as well that parents spend a great deal on children but simultaneously reduce expenditures on themselves, vicariously enjoying their children's consumption. The latter would not invalidate our analysis, but it might, again, suggest a different interpretation of the "cost" of children.
One might worry that economywide shocks could affect both general retirement behavior and consumption. Our regressions include year dummies -and they have little effect on the coefficients of primary interest. Because macroeconomic shocks conceivably affect consumption differently at different ages, we also perform GLS on a version of (11) in which we average every variable at each age over all years. Although the t statistics drop because the number of degrees of freedom falls almost 95 percent, the coefficient estimates reconfirm Table 2: for ages 
Retirement
We employ equation (15) to complete the estimation our model's structural parameters. To determine the utility-maximizing retirement age for (15) from our model, we need to specify earnings profiles, taxes, and interest rates; for the dependent variable of a regression of (15), we need empirical retirement ages. For both earning profiles and empirical retirement ages, this section turns to our second major data source, the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
Life Cycle Details. We assume a constant gross-of-income tax real interest rate of 5%/yr.
15
Our real interest rate comes from a ratio of factor payments to capital over the market value of private net worth. For the numerator, NIPA Table 1.13 gives corporate business income, indirect taxes, and total labor compensation. The first less the other two is our measure of corporate profits; the ratio of profits to profits plus labor remuneration is "profits share." We multiply the latter times corporate, noncorporate, and nonprofitinstitution income less indirect taxes. We add household-sector income (NIPA Table   1 of statistical model to predict earnings above the censoring limit. To allow for women's part-time work and absence at some ages from the labor force, we compute average earnings in all other cases from the actual data. We then use the regression time dummies to deduce an average earnings profile for women who reach 65 in 2000. Again, see Table A1 .
Finally, since HRS earnings are net of employer benefits (including health insurance, pension contributions, and employer Social Security tax), we multiply household earnings for each year by the ratio of NIPA total compensation to NIPA wages and salaries.
We derive Social Security benefits after retirement from the statutory benefit formula for 2000. Table A1 , Appendix II, shows household benefits if the male retires at age 62 and his wife retires simultaneously, at age 60. Given our treatment of consumption, we must also incorporate a stream of Medicare benefits after age 65, less participant SMI cost. To do this, for each adult 65 and older, we add to household resources Medicare benefits equaling the SMI annual premium for 2000 (i.e., $546) multiplied by the ratio of HI and SMI total expenditures to SMI premiums for 2000 (i.e., 10.7282, less 1). Again, see Table A1 .
Mean retirement age. We use the HRS as our source for empirical retirement ages; and, for reasons described above we focus on male retirement. Measuring the empirical average (male) age of retirement for this cohort is not entirely straightforward because the retirement date of many respondents is not observed. Even in the 2002 wave of the HRS, not all men have retired, and many men die or leave the survey before retiring. It follows that an average of the retirement ages among only those observed to have retired will yield a biased estimate of the population mean.
We use a censored regression to extract an unbiased estimate. Of the 6214 men who appear in one or more waves of the HRS, 727 retire before age 50 or provide insufficient information for our analysis. Excluding these, the sample is 5487. 
with dependent variable and error as in (15) . Table 4 presents our estimate of the average retirement age,μ = 62.57.
Structural Parameter Estimates. Although the preceding discussion might seem to suggest that we need to estimate (15) using a Tobit likelihood function, we can achieve exactly the same outcome with a two-step procedure as follows: estimateμ from (16); then solve for the alpha,α, that satisfiesμ = g θ(α ,β) . Our estimate of theta isθ = θ(α ,β). The so-called delta method -which uses the estimated covariance matrix forβ and the estimated variance forμ -yields an estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix forθ. Table 5 presents our estimates of the structural parameters, with and without liquidity constraint (8) . The estimates of gamma vary from -.49 to -.58; the estimates of alpha vary from .27 to .28. These correspond to estimates of an IES for services, 1/(1 − γ), of 0.63 to 0.67 and an IES for consumption itself, 1/(1 − α · γ), of 0.86 to 0.88. The estimates of the subjective time discount rate, ρ, fall between .0117 and .0139. All are statistically different from zero at the 5 percent significance level. As explained above, we favor Euler-equation
estimates that employ data only for ages 25 and beyond; consequently, Table 5 presents results based on Table 2 coefficients for samples with ages 25-79, 30-79, and 35-79. The bottom panel of Table 5 shows that liquidity constraint (8) makes little difference to our estimation.
As noted in the introduction, our estimates of gamma, alpha, and rho are similar to As a check of the validity of the model, we note that if our a priori beliefs imply that the subjective rate of time discount must be non-negative (ρ ≥ 0), our constant term in Table 3 alone puts a lower bound on γ (c.f. Weil [1989] ). In particular, suppose that ages s and t fall before retirement but after liquidity constraint (8) has ceased to bind and that household composition is the same at both ages. As in (2),
19 Barsky et al. [1997] use hypothetical questions to estimate an IES distribution for their sample. They find an average IES of 0.2, with less than 20% of respondents having an IES greater than 0.3. Others who have attempted to estimate a distribution of intertemporal elasticities of substitution find evidence that the IES is increasing with wealth (e.g., Blundell et al. [1994] ).
so, if β 1 is our estimated constant from Table 2 , we have
If ρ ≥ 0, it follows that
With r = .05 · (1 − .1428), β 1 = .0261 from Table 3 , and α about .25, we then expect
All of the estimates of Table 5 , in fact, fall comfortably within this interval, though the derivation of Table 5 in no way imposes ρ ≥ 0.
As stated, our estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is closer to 1.0 than many in the literature. Haider and Stephens [2004] argue that earlier-thananticipated retirement on the part of some households may bias one's estimate of the average decline in consumption at retirement upward by one third. Aguiar and Hurst [2004] argue that the decline tends to be overstated because increases in home production, including shopping time, allow retirees to obtain more consumption per dollar of expenditure.
On the one hand, the latter may be interpreted as somewhat similar in spirit to increased time for leisure in our model. On the other hand, a smaller empirical decline in consumption at retirement would tend to move our estimated IES even closer to the zero-change logarithmic case, where the IES is 1.0. For example, if we diminish our consumption drop by one third in the middle column at the top of Table 5 , our point estimates for gamma and alpha become -.37 and .28, respectively; thus, our point estimate of the IES for consumption/leisure service flows rises from .63 to .73, and our estimate of the IES for consumption alone rises from .86 to .91.
Finally, we believe that our analysis suggests a coherent description of the practical role of liquidity constraints in the life-cycle model. Ostensibly, our results seem contradictory: Tables 2-3 show evidence of binding liquidity constraints only through (female) age 22, but by 3 percent using the same steps, the liquidity constraint never binds at all. Evidently, having the constraint bind in youth is a knife-edge phenomenon heavily dependent upon the general rate of earnings growth at the time. In the end, we believe that Tables 2-3 can cause young households to hit liquidity constraints for almost their first decade; more normal macroeconomic growth can make constraint (8) virtually irrelevant.
Household Net Worth
In each wave, the HRS collects data on household net worth. This section compares simulated net worth from our model with the survey data. As preceding sections make no reference to wealth data, the reader can view the new comparisons as providing an out-of-sample evaluation of our model and parameter estimates. There is a second reason the new comparisons are interesting: in contrast to many existing studies, our framework incorporates "consumption paradox" behavior, which should tend to decrease wealth accumulation prior to retirement. well, which provides a measure of net worth that is nearly always positive.
We then regress log comprehensive net worth on year, male age, and years since (male) retirement -see Table A3 , Appendix III. The regression restricts the sample to couples whose male retired at age 59-65, and for each such couple, it uses the first valid net worth observation. We use log net worth as our dependent variable (omitting the five observations for which net worth is zero or negative -see Table A2 ) because we believe the regressors should register percentage changes. Section 5 estimates an average retirement age of 62.5; thus, we use the regression of Table A3 to predict comprehensive net worth at male ages 62 and 63. We make the predictions for households in which the wife (assumed two years junior to her husband) reaches 65 in the year 2000. In the case of retirement age 62, for instance, if the standard error for our new net worth regression is s, the new regression coefficients are (ζ 1 , ..., ζ 22 ), v ≡ (1, 0, .5, .5, 0, ..., 0), and the matrix of regressors in Table A3 is X, predicted net worth is
Using maximum likelihood estimates of the covariance matrix for (ζ , s), the delta method provides a confidence interval. a. Male age (all households here headed by couples). b. Omitting negative and zero values, we regress log total net worth on a constant, survey-wave and male age dummies, and years since male retirement. The sample is retired couples whose male retired age 59-65. Assuming wives are two years younger than their husbands, we predict net worth for households whose wife turned 65 in 2000. Table 3 ]) seems to show noticeably more net worth than Table A2 . 20 We think of our model as being calibrated to the U.S. population excluding the extreme upper tail of the wealth distribution -with an analysis of the latter presumably requiring a description of intentional bequests (e.g., Modigliani [1986] , Laitner [2001] , and others).
Conclusions
A number of recent papers describe a substantial drop in household expenditures at retirement, a drop that some argue demonstrates the limits of a strictly rational life-cycle model. This paper reconciles the life-cycle saving model with the "retirement-consumption puzzle," and then uses the empirical change in expenditure at retirement to provide a new and, we believe, attractive source of identification for parameters of the life-cycle model.
We show that a tractable life-cycle specification with nonseparable intratemporal utility, and with work options that are discrete, predicts a discontinuous change in consumption at retirement. We then show that if one is willing to thus treat the change in household consumption at retirement as a consequence of purposeful behavior, the magnitude of the change provides useful information for estimating life-cycle model parameters, especially the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Intuitively, if a household's taste for intertemporal smoothing is sufficiently high, it will choose to decrease its consumption at retirement so that lost utility from consumption offsets gains from additional leisure. If it has a lower desire for intertemporal smoothing, on the other hand, the household might want to increase its consumption at retirement to take advantage of the complementarity of consumption and leisure. The size, and sign, of the consumption change play a crucial role in our estimation of households' IES.
Our strategy of using the consumption-retirement puzzle to estimate life-cycle parameters provides information about the robustness of existing IES estimates to variation in method of estimation and decision domain. In addition, our method has the advantage that it estimates the IES from changes associated with a highly predictable and consequential life event -retirement. The standard approach, which instruments for asset returns in period t + 1 using economic variables known in period t, suffers from the problems of weak instruments. We argue that, in this sense, changes in consumption at retirement offer a more robust and credible source of variation from which to estimate this critical parameter.
We implement our identification strategy using pseudo-panel data from the U.S. Con- Our estimated model performs well when we compare its predictions about retirement wealth holdings with actual wealth data from the HRS (which did not inform our estimation), and the model interestingly suggests that liquidity constraints may play a role in determining the path of consumption at young ages. Because the model is especially well suited for studying retirement behavior, our future work will use our estimates to perform policy experiments to obtain quantitative predictions of, for example, the effects of possible Social Security reforms on the labor supply of older Americans.
Medicare, funding for the benefits comes from a hospital insurance (HI) tax on wages and salaries, monthly premiums for supplementary medical insurance (SMI) from people currently eligible for benefits, and contributions from general tax revenues to SMI. The CEX registers only SMI premiums from participants; so, we allocate the yearly total of Medicare benefits (both HI and all SMI expenditure) to the CEX sample in proportion to SMI premium payments (principally for people over 65). 3. The NIPA "personal business" category includes bank and brokerage fees, many of which are hidden in the form of low interest on saving accounts, etc., and hence absent from expenditures which CEX households perceive. We assume that bank and brokerage fees make their way into the life-cycle model in the form of lower-than-otherwise interest rates on saving; therefore, we normalize annual personal business expenditures measured in the CEX to match the corresponding NIPA amount less bank and brokerage fees, and omit bank and brokerage fees from our measure of consumption.
of NIPA total medical consumption. 
